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Abstract: Finite potential games have Nash equilibria in pure strategies. This note provides
some results on the existence of equilibria or approximate equilibria if some players have innite
sets of strategies.
1 Introduction
Potential games incorporate information about Nash equilibria in a single real-valued function,
called a potential, on the strategy space. These games were introduced in Monderer and Shapley
(1996). After recalling the denitions of exact, ordinal and generalized ordinal potential games
in section 2, it will follow easily that maxima of a potential function with respect to unilateral
deviations are Nash equilibria of the game. Since a potential function of a nite potential game
always has a maximum, such games have at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This
need no longer be the case if innite games are considered. If a Nash equilibrium does not exist,
there may be instances of the game in which players either receive a large payo that satises
them or cannot gain too much from deviating. Such an instance is an approximate equilibrium.
The denition of approximate equilibria is also recalled in section 2.
The main purpose of this paper is to provide some results on the existence of Nash equilibria
or approximate equilibria in innite potential games.
In section 3 we look at approximate equilibria. We show that generalized ordinal potential
games in which at most one player has an innite set of strategies always has approximate
equilibria. This generalizes a theorem from Norde and Tijs (1996) on exact potential games to
ordinal and generalized ordinal potential games.
An open problem from Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) is solved in section 4 by showing that
an ordinal potential game where all players have compact strategy sets and continuous payo
functions may not have a continuous ordinal potential function.
I thank Stef Tijs, Peter Borm, and Henk Norde for useful comments.
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2 Denitions and preliminary results
A strategic game is a tuple G = hN; fX igi2N ; fu
igi2Ni, where N = f1; : : : ; ng; n 2 IN is the
player set, for each i 2 N the set of player i's strategies is X i, and ui :
Q
i2N
X i ! IR is player
i's payo function.
For brevity, we dene X =
Q
i2N
X i and for i 2 N : X i =
Q
j2Nnfig
Xj. Let x =
(x1; : : : ; xn) 2 X and i 2 N . Then x i 2 X i is the vector (x1; : : : ; xi 1; xi+1; : : : ; xn). With a
slight abuse of notation, we denote x = (xi; x i).
The following denitions are due to Monderer and Shapley (1996). A strategic game G =
hN; fX igi2N ; fu
igi2Ni is
 an exact potential game if there exists a function P : X ! IR such that for all i 2 N , for
all x i 2 X i and all yi; zi 2 X i:
ui(yi; x i)  ui(zi; x i) = P (yi; x i)  P (zi; x i):
 an ordinal potential game if there exists a function P : X ! IR such that for all i 2 N , for
all x i 2 X i and all yi; zi 2 X i:
ui(yi; x i)  ui(zi; x i) > 0, P (yi; x i)  P (zi; x i) > 0:
 a generalized ordinal potential game if there exists a function P : X ! IR such that for all
i 2 N , for all x i 2 X i and all yi; zi 2 X i:
ui(yi; x i)  ui(zi; x i) > 0) P (yi; x i)  P (zi; x i) > 0:
Such a function P is called an (exact, ordinal or generalized) potential of the game G. Clearly,
an exact potential game is an ordinal potential game, which in its turn is a generalized ordinal
potential game. In exact potential games the dierence in the value of the potential equal the
dierence in the payo to the deviating player. In ordinal potential games only the signs of the
dierences match. Generalized ordinal potential games allow for freedom in the potential if a
deviating player's payo does not change.
Economic applications of potential games include oligopolies (Slade, 1994) and congestion
situations (Rosenthal, 1973).
The potential maximizer of a generalized ordinal potential game G = hN; fX igi2N ; fu
igi2Ni
is the set of strategy combinations x 2 X for which some potential P achieves a maximum. The
following proposition follows immediately from these denitions.
Proposition 2.1 Let G = hN; fX igi2N ; fu
igi2Ni be a generalized ordinal potential game and
P a potential for G. If x 2 X is a Nash equilibrium of hN; fxigi2N ; fPgi2Ni, i.e., of the game
with all payo functions replaced by P , then x is a Nash equilibrium of G. In particular, every
nite generalized ordinal potential game has at least one Nash equilibrium, since the potential
maximizer is nonempty.
If G is an exact or ordinal potential game and x is a Nash equilibrium of G, then x is also a
Nash equilibrium of hN; fxigi2N ; fPgi2Ni. This is not necessarily true for generalized ordinal
potential games.
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Example 2.1 Consider a two-player game with strategy space X = X1  X2 and u1(x) =
u2(x) = 0 for all x 2 X . Then any function P : X ! IR is a generalized ordinal potential
function, so the maxima of P w.r.t. unilateral deviations not necessarily pick out all pure Nash
equilibria of the game.
An improvement path is a sequence (x1; x2; : : :) of elements xk 2 X such that for all k 2 IN
the strategy combinations xk and xk+1 dier in exactly one, say the i(k)-th, coordinate and
ui(k)(xk) < u
i(k)(xk+1). A nite improvement path (x1; : : : ; xk), with k  3, is an improvement
cycle if x1 = xk.
Lemma 2.1 Let G = hN; fX igi2N ; fu
igi2Ni be a generalized ordinal potential game. Then G
contains no improvement cycles.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that (x1; : : : ; xk) is an improvement cycle of G. Let P be a
potential for G. Since for all l = 1; :::; k   1 : ui(l)(xl) < u
i(l)(xl+1), we have P (x1) <    <
P (xk) = P (x1), a contradiction. 2
Let  > 0; k 2 IR. A strategy xi 2 X i of player i is called an -best response to x i 2 X i if
ui(xi; x i)  sup
yi2Xi
ui(yi; x i)  
and a k-guaranteeing response to x i 2 X i if
ui(xi; x i)  k:
If xi is either an -best or k-guaranteeing response (or both) to x i, it is called an (; k)-best
response. Notice that an (; k)-best response to x i always exists. A strategy combination
(x1; : : : ; xn) is called an -equilibrium of the game G if for each i 2 N , xi is an -best response
to x i. It is called an (; k)-equilibrium if xi is an (; k)-best response to x i for all i 2 N . In
such an equilibrium, each player can gain at most  from deviating or receives at least a utility
of k.
A game is called weakly determined if it has an (; k)-equilibrium for every  > 0 and every
k 2 IR.
We conclude this section with some examples to illustrate these denitions. Notice that a
one-person game is trivially a potential game.
Example 2.2 Consider a one-person game with the player having strategy space Z and u(x) = x
for all x 2 Z. This game has no Nash equilibria, but is weakly determined, since for every k 2 IR,
x = bk+1c is a k-guaranteeing response, where for r 2 IN; brc is the largest integer not exceeding
r.
Example 2.3 Consider a one-person game with the player having strategy space (0;1) and
u(x) =   1
x




The following example from Norde and Tijs (1996) shows that innite potential games may not
be weakly determined.
Example 2.4 Consider the 11-bimatrix game with payo functions u1(i; j) = i   j and
u2(i; j) = j   i, where i; j 2 IN. This is an exact potential game, with a potential P (i; j) = i+ j
for all i; j 2 IN. Clearly, this game does not have (; k)-equilibria whenever k > 0.
3
3 Equilibria and approximate equilibria in innite games
Norde and Tijs (1996) provide theorems on equilibrium existence for several classes of games with
an exact potential. Their proofs are largely based either on the equality sign in the denition
of an exact potential or on a characterization of exact potential games in terms of coordination
and dummy games (See Facchini et al. (1995); a similar characterization for Cournot games was
given in Slade (1994)). As a consequence, their proofs do not carry over to ordinal or generalized
ordinal potential games. Theorem 3.1 generalizes one of their results. If at most one player in a
generalized ordinal potential game has an innite set of strategies, the game has (; k)-equilibria
for all  > 0; k 2 IR.
Theorem 3.1 Let G = hN; fX igi2N ; fu
igi2Ni be a generalized ordinal potential game. If
X1; : : : ; Xn 1 are nite sets, then G is weakly determined.




Let  > 0; k 2 IR. Construct a sequence  = (x1; x2; : : :) in X as follows: Take x
n 2 Xn, dene
x1 = (x
n; (xn)). Let m 2 IN. Suppose xm is dened. If m is odd, and
 xn
m
is not an (; k)-best response to x n
m
, take xm+1 = (x
n; x n
m





If m is even, and
 x n
m
62 argmaxx n2X n P (x
n
m







If the sequence  is nite, the terminal point is clearly an (; k)-equilibrium. So now assume
this sequence is innite.
Since the sets X1; : : : ; Xn 1 are nite, there exist l;m 2 IN such that l is even, m is odd,






















), the other players cannot improve at all. Hence xm is an (; k)-equilibrium. 2
Example 2.4 indicates that this result cannot be extended to include two or more players with
an innite strategy set.
Under dierent assumptions we can also establish existence, like in the following theorem.
Recall that a real-valued function f on a topological space T is called upper semi-continuous
(u.s.c.) if for each c 2 IR the set fx 2 T jf(x)  cg is closed.
Theorem 3.2 Let G = hN; fX igi2N ; fu
igi2Ni be a generalized ordinal potential game. If
X1; : : : ; Xn 1 are nite, Xn is a compact topological space and un is u.s.c. in the n-th co-
ordinate, then G has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Fix for each x n 2 X n an element (x n) 2 (x n) = argmaxz2Xn u
n(z; x n), which
is possible by the upper semi-continuity and compactness conditions.
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Suppose that G is not determined. Let x n 2 X n. Take x1 = ((x
 n); x n). Then there











), and otherwise xk+1 = (z; x
 i
k




Since X n is nite and player n uses only strategies from f(x n)jx n 2 X ng, there exist
k; l 2 IN; k < l, such that xk = xl. Hence (xk; xk+1; : : : ; xl) is an improvement cycle. However,
Lemma 2.1 shows that the absence of improvement cycles is necessary for the existence of a
potential function, which yields the desired contradiction. 2
A similar result for a dierent class of potential games is given in Voorneveld (1996).
4 Continuity of potential functions
Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) study properties of the potential maximizer. It was left as an open
problem in their paper whether ordinal potential games on a compact strategy space with payo
functions ui which are continuous in the i-th coordinate have a non-empty potential maximizer
or, even stronger, whether all such ordinal potential games possess a continuous potential. The
result from this section indicates that this is not the case, even if payo functions are continuous
in each coordinate.
Theorem 4.1 There exists an ordinal potential game with compact strategy spaces and contin-
uous payo functions for which no potential achieves a maximum and which consequently has
no continuous ordinal potential function.
Proof. Consider the game with N = f1; 2g, X1 = X2 = [0; 1], and payo functions dened as
u1(x; y) =
(















Clearly, these payo functions are continuous. Moreover,
P (x; y) =
(









n=1) ordinal potential for the
game. This follows easily from u1(x; y) = y5P (x; y) and u2(x; y) = x5P (x; y).
Now consider any ordinal potential Q for this game and the path C in the strategy space
from (1; 1) to (1
2












) : : : This path is depicted in Figure 1.
For n 2 IN0 and y =
1
2n





]. We will work out this case and leave other similar cases to the reader. The partial










































































Figure 1: The strategy space and path C from Theorem 3.1
Since 1
2n+1
 x  1
2n








, which is equivalent to
 4
22n








Similarly, for n 2 IN and x = 1
2n
the functions u2(x; ) and (hence) Q(x; ) are strictly




]. This implies that Q must strictly increase along the path C from (1; 1)
to (0; 0).
Also Q(x; 0) = Q(1; 0) < Q(1; 1) and Q(0; y) = Q(0; 1) < Q(1; 1). Once again using the
above, if (x; y) lies to the right of C, like the point a in Figure 1, and (x0; y) is on C, like
the point a0, then Q(x; y) < Q(x0; y), since given y 2 (0; 1), there exists a n 2 IN such that
1
2n
 y < 1
2n 1
. Then by denition ( 1
2n
; y) is on C and u1(; y) is strictly decreasing on [ 1
2n
; 1].
Also, if (x; y) lies to the left of C, like the point b, and (x; y0) is on C, like the point b0, then
Q(x; y) < Q(x; y0), since, given x 2 (0; 1), there exists an n 2 IN such that 1
2n+1
 x < 1
2n
. Then
by denition (x; 1
2n
) is on C and u2(x; ) is strictly decreasing on [ 1
2n
; 1].




) for some n 2 IN. For the






n=0 is strictly increasing, Q has no maximum, which is what we had to prove.
The continuity of a potential function for this game together with the compactness of the
strategy space in the product topology would imply the existence of a maximum, contradicting
our proof. Hence this game has no continuous potential. 2
6
Notice that continuity, however, is too strong a requirement. Reasonable conditions may exist
under which a potential turns out to be upper semi-continuous, which given the compactness of
the strategy space would still result in a maximum.
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